It is settled law of interpretation that entries in the Seventh Schedule are not powers but fields of legislation. The legislature derives its power from Article 246 and other related articles of the Constitution. Therefore, the power to make the Amendment Act is derived not from the respective entries but under Article 246 of the Constitution.

 

Doctrine of Pith and Substance

This post is concerned with a doctrine of similar sorts called as ‘Doctrine of Pith and Substance’. The basic purpose of this doctrine is to determine under which head of power or field i.e. under which list (given in the Seventh Schedule) a given piece of legislation falls.

Pith means ‘true nature’ or ‘essence of something’ and Substance means ‘the most important or essential part of something’.

Doctrine of Pith and Substance says that where the question arises of determining whether a particular law relates to a particular subject (mentioned in one List or another), the court looks to the substance of the matter. Thus, if the substance falls within Union List, then the incidental encroachment by the law on the State List does not make it invalid.

This is essentially a Canadian Doctrine now firmly entrenched in the Indian Constitutional Jurisprudence. This doctrine found its place first in the case of Cushing v. Dupey. In this case the Privy Council evolved the doctrine, that for deciding whether an impugned legislation was intra vires, regard must be had to its pith and substance.

Need for the Doctrine of Pith and Substance in the Indian Context

The doctrine has been applied in India also to provide a degree of flexibility in the otherwise rigid scheme of distribution of powers. The reason for adoption of this doctrine is that if every  legislation were to be declared invalid on the grounds that it encroached powers, the powers of the legislature would be drastically circumscribed.

“It is settled law of interpretation that entries in the Seventh Schedule are not powers but fields of legislation. The legislature derives its power from Article 246 and other related articles of the Constitution. Therefore, the power to make the Amendment Act is derived not from the respective entries but under Article 246 of the Constitution. The language of the respective entries should be given the widest scope of their meaning, fairly capable to meet the machinery of the Government settled by the Constitution. Each general word should extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended in it. When the vires of an enactment is impugned, there is an initial presumption of its constitutionality and if there is any difficulty in ascertaining the limits of the legislative power, the difficulty must be resolved, as far as possible in favour of the legislature putting the most liberal construction upon the legislative entry so that it may have the widest amplitude.” 

Incidental or Ancillary Encroachment

The case of Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. The Bank of Commerce (AIR-1947) succinctly explained the situation in which a State Legislature dealing with any matter may incidentally affect any Item in the Union List. The court held that whatever may be the ancillary or incidental effects of a Statute enacted by a State Legislature, such a matter must be attributed to the Appropriate List according to its true nature and character.

Thus, we see that if the encroachment by the State Legislature is only incidental in nature, it will not affect the Competence of the State Legislature to enact the law in question. Also, if the substance of the enactment falls within the Union List then the incidental encroachment by the enactment on the State List would not make it invalid.

However, the situation relating to Pith and Substance is a bit different with respect to the Concurrent List. If a Law covered by an entry in the State List made by the State Legislature contains a provision which directly and substantially relates to a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List and is repugnant to the provisions of any existing law with respect to that matter in the Concurrent List, then the repugnant provision in the State List may be void unless it can coexist and operate without repugnancy to the provisions of the existing law.

Important Supreme Court Judgments on the Doctrine of Pith and Substance

There are hundreds of judgments that have applied this doctrine to ascertain the true nature of a legislation. In the present post, I will discuss some of the prominent judgments of the Supreme Court of India that have resorted to this doctrine.

1. The State of Bombay And Another vs F.N. Balsara(AIR-1951) - This is the first important judgment of the Supreme Court that took recourse to the Doctrine of Pith and Substance. The court upheld the Doctrine of Pith and Substance and said that it is important to ascertain the true nature and character of a legislation for the purpose of determining the List under which it falls.

2. Mt. Atiqa Begam And Anr. v. Abdul Maghni Khan And Ors.(AIR-1940) – The court held that in order to decide whether the impugned Act falls under which entry, one has to ascertain the true nature and character of the enactment i.e. its ‘pith and substance’. The court further said that “it is the result of this investigation, not the form alone which the statute may have assumed under the hand of the draughtsman, that will determine within which of the Legislative Lists the legislation falls and for this purpose the legislation must be scrutinized in its entirety”.

3. Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh  v. State of Maharashtra and Ors(AIR-2010)– Pith and Substance has been beautifully explained in this case:

“This doctrine is applied when the legislative competence of the legislature with regard to a particular enactment is challenged with reference to the entries in various lists. If there is a challenge to the legislative competence, the courts will try to ascertain the pith and substance of such enactment on a scrutiny of the Act in question. In this process, it is necessary for the courts to go into and examine the true character of the enactment, its object, its scope and effect to find out whether the enactment in question is genuinely referable to a field of the legislation allotted to the respective legislature under the constitutional scheme. 

This doctrine is an established principle of law in India recognized not only by this Court, but also by various High Courts. Where a challenge is made to the constitutional validity of a particular State Act with reference to a subject mentioned in any entry in List I, the Court has to look to the substance of the State Act and on such analysis and examination, if it is found that in the pith and substance, it falls under an entry in the State List but there is only an incidental encroachment on any of the matters enumerated in the Union List, the State Act would not become invalid merely because there is incidental encroachment on any of the matters in the Union List.”

Doctrine of colorable Legislation

Doctrine of Colorable Legislation like any other constitutional law doctrine is a tool devised and applied by the Supreme Court of India to interpret various Constitutional Provisions. It is a guiding principle of immense utility while construing provisions relating to legislative competence.

Origin 

Before knowing what this doctrine is and how it is applied in India, let us first understand the genesis of Doctrine of Colorable Legislation.

Doctrine of Colorable Legislation is built upon the founding stones of the Doctrine of Separation of Power. Separation of Power mandates that a balance of power is to be struck between the different components of the State i.e. between the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. The Primary Function of the legislature is to make laws. Whenever, Legislature tries to shift this balance of power towards itself then the Doctrine of Colorable Legislation is attracted to take care of Legislative Accountability.

Definition

Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘Colorable’ as:

1. Appearing to be true, valid or right.

2. Intended to deceive; counterfeit.

3. ‘Color’ has been defined to mean ‘Appearance, guise or semblance’.

The literal meaning of Colorable Legislation is that under the ‘color’ or ‘guise’ of power conferred for one particular purpose, the legislature cannot seek to achieve some other purpose which it is otherwise not competent to legislate on.

Maxim- This Doctrine also traces its origin to a Latin Maxim:

“Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum”

This maxim implies that “when anything is prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly”. In common parlance, it is meant to be understood as “Whatever legislature can’t do directly, it can’t do indirectly”.

In our Constitution, this doctrine is usually applied to Article 246 which has demarcated the Legislative Competence of the Parliament and the State Legislative Assemblies by outlining the different subjects under List I for the Union, List II for the States and List III for both, as mentioned in the Seventh Schedule.

This doctrine comes into play when a Legislature does not possess the power to make law upon a particular subject but nonetheless indirectly makes one. By applying this principle the fate of the Impugned Legislation is decided.

Supreme Court on Colorable Legislation

One of the most cogent and lucid explanations relating to this doctrine was given in the case of K.C. Gajapati Narayana Deo And Other v. The State Of Orissa(AIR-1953):

“If the Constitution of a State distributes the legislative powers amongst different bodies, which have to act within their respective spheres marked out by specific legislative entries, or if there are limitations on the legislative authority in the shape of fundamental rights, questions do arise as to whether the legislature in a particular case has or has not, in respect to the subject-matter of the statute or in the method of enacting it, transgressed the limits of its constitutional powers.

Such transgression may be patent, manifest or direct, but it may also be disguised, covert and indirect and it is to this latter class of cases that the expression ‘Colorable Legislation’ has been applied in certain judicial pronouncements. The idea conveyed by the expression is that although apparently a legislature in passing a statute purported to act within the limits of its powers, yet in substance and in reality it transgressed these powers, the transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper examination, to be a mere presence or disguise.”

This Doctrine is also called as “Fraud on the Constitution”. The failure to comply with a Constitutional condition for the exercise of legislative power may be overt or it may be covert. When it is overt, we say the law is obviously bad for non- compliance with the requirements of the Constitution, that is to say, the law is ultra vires. When, however, the non-compliance is covert, we say that it is a ‘fraud on the Constitution’, the fraud complained of being that the Legislature pretends to act within its power while in fact it is not so doing. Therefore, the charge of ‘fraud on the Constitution’ is, on ultimate analysis, nothing but a picturesque and epigrammatic way of expressing the idea of non-compliance with the terms of the Constitution.

Limitations on the Application of Doctrine of Colorable Legislation

1. The doctrine has no application where the powers of a Legislature are not fettered by any Constitutional limitation.

2. The doctrine is also not applicable to Subordinate Legislation.

3. The doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any question of bona fides or mala fides on the part of the legislature. The whole doctrine resolves itself into the, question of competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular law.

If the legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives which impelled it to act are really irrelevant. On the other hand, if the legislature lacks competency, the question of motive does not arise at all. Whether a statute is constitutional or not is thus always a question of power[.

4. A logical corollary of the above-mentioned point is that the Legislature does not act on Extraneous Considerations. There is always a Presumption of Constitutionality in favour of the Statute. The principle of Presumption of Constitutionality was succinctly enunciated by a Constitutional Bench in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Ors.(AIR 1957)

“That there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles.”

There is a very famous rule of interpretation as well that explains why the courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. The Latin Maxim “construction ut res magis valeat quam pereat” implies that a statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative. The courts prefer construction which keeps the statute within the competence of the legislature.

5. When a Legislature has the Power to make Law with respect to a particular subject, it also has all the ancillary and incidental power to make that law an effective one. 

6. As already discussed above that the transgression of Constitutional Power by Legislature may be patent, manifest or direct, but may also be disguised, covert and indirect and it is only to this latter class of cases that the expression “Colorable Legislation” is being applied.